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Abstract
We study the anticompetitive e ects of predatory pricing and the e cacy
of three policy responses. In a series of experiments where an incumbent
and a potential entrant interact, we compare prices, market structures
and welfare. Under a laissez-faire regime, the threat of post-entry price
cuts discourages entry, and allows incumbents to charge monopoly prices.
Current U.S. policy (Brooke Group) does not help. A policy suggested
by Baumol (1979) lowers post-exit prices, while Edlin’s (2002) proposal
reduces pre-entry prices and encourages entry. While both policies show
outcomes after entry that are less competitive than under Laissez-Faire,
they nevertheless increase consumer welfare.
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1 Introduction
Incumbent monopolies often respond aggressively to entry. Names for this be-
havior vary, depending upon context or upon whether the name caller thinks it
is desirable. The aggressive response could be called “vigorous competition” or
“predatory pricing” when there is a single product, or it might be called a “bun-
dled discount” or a “price-squeeze” when there are multiple products. Regardless
of the context, an important question is whether entrants should ever be protected
from such exclusionary pricing if they cannot survive on their own and if so how?
Typically, in a predatory pricing case, aggressive response to entry is tested by
comparing some measure of the monopoly’s price to cost, and entrants are only
protected from below-cost pricing. Increasingly, litigants, legal scholars, and courts
extend below-cost pricing tests to multiproduct pricing conduct and some argue
that nonprice aggression like exclusive dealing should be handled the same way
(Eilat et al., 2016).1
We study the question of when aggressive responses to entry should be regu-
lated in the specific context of the one-product predatory pricing debate, but we
believe our analysis has wider implications. In particular, we ask when, if ever,
unrestricted price cutting by a monopoly is undesirable either because it drives
entrants from the market or because its prospect discourages entry. Our experi-
mental approach suggests that there may be consumer or competition gains from
regulating price cutting, at least when a monopoly incumbent has cost advantages.
Previous literature has focused mainly on below-cost predatory pricing. Skep-
tical commentators have variously compared this pricing behavior to unicorns
(Baker, 1994, p.586), dragons (Easterbrook, 1981, p.264), and basketball play-
ers scoring sixty four points in a game (Elzinga and Mills, 2001, p.2479). They
argue that price cutting is generally good for consumers and they contend that it
is bad only in fairy tales told by theorists or in extremely rare circumstances in
practice.2 This argument would support a laissez-faire policy to predatory pricing.
1For a discussion on how the approaches to predatory pricing and to margin squeeze are re-
lated see, for example, OECD, Margin Squeeze DAF/COMP(2009)36 and Gaudin and Mantzari
(2016). See also FTC and DOJ, Workshop Transcript on Conditional Pricing Practices: Eco-
nomic Analysis & Policy Implications (June 23, 2014) on the predatory pricing standard for
conditional pricing practices.
2In the wake of this view, a comprehensive theoretical literature developed to rationalize
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It has been used by the U.S. Supreme Court to justify a test for legality that bans
only price cuts which leave prices below marginal or average variable cost (Brooke
Group, 1993).3
We think the focus on below-cost pricing may be misguided. Incumbent mo-
nopolies often have cost or other advantages, which may be the reason why they
are monopolists. Such advantages are di cult to o set by potential entrants in
the short term. In such settings, above-cost price cuts are the real threat (see e.g.
Farrell and Saloner (1986)): it is entirely credible that an incumbent monopoly
will react to entry by pricing below an entrant’s cost but above its own cost. Such
pricing, though indistinguishable from static equilibrium play, has undesirable ef-
fects: like below-cost predatory pricing, it will drive the entrant from the market.
Because of these exclusionary e ects, it has been called “above-cost predatory
pricing”. Our aim is not to determine what motivates the firm’s aggressive pricing,
i.e., to pin down predatory intent, but rather to study the exclusionary e ects
of such pricing behavior. In particular, we ask whether price drops after entry
discourage entry, or eliminate the threat of entry in a way that hurts consumers
or overall welfare, and whether policies can improve the situation. We call such
exclusionary pricing “above-cost predatory pricing” if it is above the monopoly’s
cost, and “below-cost predatory pricing” if it is below the monopoly’s cost.4
A typical view of the tradeo  in predatory pricing policy, be it above or below
cost, is that condemning these low prices sacrifices a beneficial price war (a bird
in hand) in the speculative hope of promoting lower prices in the future (a bird
in the bush). The beneficial price war is, however, equally speculative and will
predatory pricing by means of reputation-building (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), signaling models
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Scharfstein, 1984; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Saloner, 1987) and
financial constraints (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). These theories are mostly based on infor-
mation asymmetries and center on the idea that the incumbent has an incentive to influence
the entrant’s beliefs about future profits. We study a simpler setting without any information
asymmetries. Theories of predation that do not depend on information asymmetries include
Harrington (1986); Cabral and Riordan (1994, 1997); Motta and Fumagalli (2013).
3Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
4Edlin (2002, 2012), Salop (2005, 2006), Popofsky (2006) and Hovenkamp (2005) all discuss
above-cost exclusionary conduct. In a famous predatory pricing case, Barry Wright, Judge
Breyer (as a district court judge before he joined the Supreme Court) acknowledged that above-
cost price cuts could be undesirable but worried that problematic price cutting could not be
distinguished from desirable limit pricing that discouraged entry but provided persistent low
prices to consumers.
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only happen if there is entry. And lack of entry is the big problem in a monopoly
market. If a high-cost rival fears predatory pricing, it will not challenge a low-
cost incumbent even if the latter charges high prices. The consequence can be
persistent high pricing without entry. To remedy this, Edlin (2002) proposes that
an incumbent should not be allowed to lower its prices substantially to avoid being
undercut by an entrant. The idea is to encourage low pricing by the incumbent
prior to entry and to encourage entry if the incumbent charges high prices. This
policy is thus dynamic, focusing on price patterns, in contrast to Brooke Group
which focuses on price level.
Baumol (1979) likewise proposed a dynamic policy to combat predatory pricing.
The Baumol policy would prevent an incumbent from raising prices after having
fought o  an entrant with price cuts. This policy might have better properties than
Edlin’s conditional upon entry because then price competition is not restricted,
but it does not appear to o er entrants as much protection and could in theory
still allow persistent high prices if it does not manage to facilitate entry.
This paper serves two purposes. First, we provide an experimental test for the
existence of above-cost predatory pricing. Second, we compare the e ectiveness of
di erent policy rules (Brooke Group, Baumol and Edlin) in mitigating its e ects.
To date, there is mainly anecdotal evidence for predatory pricing. For instance,
in the American Airlines case in the U.S., several entrants were driven from the
Dallas-Fort Worth market by American. American priced high before entry and
after exit. The entrants brought significantly lower prices, but only for short
periods before they were driven from the market. The Department of Justice
introduced evidence showing that American priced low to drive entrants out, but
could not win their case under the prevailing policy (Brooke Group rule) because
American did not price below its variable cost. Although there is some systematic
empirical work to identify predatory pricing (e.g., Lerner (1995); Scott Morton
(1997); Podolny and Scott Morton (1999); Genesove and Mullin (2006)), this work
does not analyze policy e ects.
To go beyond anecdotal evidence, we use a laboratory approach. Existing
experiments focus on below-cost pricing trying to settle the debate about whether
it exists, is credible, and induces exit. The seminal paper in this literature is Isaac
and Smith (1985), which defines predatory pricing as pricing below marginal cost
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(at p. 330), and searches for it in vain, thereby supporting the unicorn view.5
Overall, the evidence on below-cost pricing in the laboratory is mixed: while
Harrison (1988) reports numerous cases of below-cost pricing in an experiment
with multiple markets, Goeree and Gomez (1998), replicating Harrison’s study,
find virtually no evidence of below-cost pricing. However, in a modified design with
entry prior to pricing decisions and a simpler demand schedule, a reliable pattern
of below-cost predation emerges (Goeree and Gomez, 1998; Capra et al., 2000).
Likewise, Chiaravutthi (2007) finds substantial evidence of below-cost predatory
pricing in markets with network externalities.6
We study predatory pricing in the lab because of a central problem with any
empirical approach to the subject: such pricing may deter entry without ever being
observed. Would-be entrants, willing to price much lower than a monopolist, do
not enter for fear of being wiped out in a subsequent price war (Ezrachi and
Gilo, 2009, 2010). Identifying such a problem in the field is challenging. If we
see “insu cient entry,” when can we attribute it to predatory pricing?7 Without
policy variation, we cannot reliably know what would happen under alternative
policies. Would there be more entry? Would prices be lower? In the lab, we
can exogenously vary policy, while leaving everything else fixed. We can compare
a laissez-faire environment with one where price cuts are restricted. Behavioral
di erences between the two settings can thus unambiguously be attributed to the
possibility of predatory pricing. Moreover, the experimental approach allows us to
identify the causal e ects of di erent policies in a particularly clean fashion, as it
is straightforward to implement ceteris paribus policy variations in the lab.8
We study a setting with perfect information and without financial constraints.
There is an incumbent monopoly with low costs, but a rival might be tempted
5Isaac and Smith (1985) hypothesize that as there is no predatory pricing, antitrust inter-
vention will ironically limit competition. They study the Baumol policy and find that Baumol’s
policy leads to cooperatively shared monopoly. They neither study Edlin nor Brooke Group.
6Jung et al. (1994) report instances of predatory behavior in an experimental chain store
signaling game where they allow reputations to develop. Their results are somewhat di cult to
put in our context as there is no information of firms’ prices and quantities.
7An interesting approach to the related problem of not being able to empirically identify the
threat of entry separately from actual entry is Goolsbee and Syverson (2008). They show that
incumbents respond to entry announcements in the passenger airline industry.
8Another reason for taking predatory pricing to the laboratory is the di culty to apply cost-
based tests in practice (Normann and Ricciuti, 2009; Gomez et al., 2008).
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to enter because the incumbent’s monopoly price exceeds the rival’s cost. An
unregulated monopolist can thus drive the rival from the market while still earning
positive profits. Our basic question is whether entry results and how this depends
upon the policy environment.
We consider dynamic Bertrand-style price competition over four market pe-
riods, allowing for four policy treatments: 1. “Laissez-faire,” which has no reg-
ulation; 2. “Brooke Group,” which bans below-cost pricing; 3. “Baumol,” which
makes post-entry price cuts permanent; and 4. “Edlin,” which bans certain post-
entry price cuts. These policies a ect entry and exit as well as pre- and post-entry
pricing; thereby they influence consumer and total welfare.
Under policies 1–3, any equilibrium involves monopoly pricing for four periods
with no entry: the policies make no connection between pre-entry prices and future
prices, so that the firms will charge monopoly prices prior to entry. Moreover, the
rival will not enter because the incumbent will respond with price reductions,
driving the entrant from the market and making entry unprofitable.
Under Edlin, there is likewise no entry, but to ensure this, the monopoly must
price low prior to entry, because it is not free to cut prices after entry.9 In theory,
Edlin’s proposal thus leads to higher consumer surplus and welfare because it
makes the market contestable. Thus, the high-cost entrant can play an e ciency-
enhancing role without entering the market.
Our experiment shows that in Laissez-faire there tends to be monopoly pricing
prior to entry, and there is often no entry (consistent with a fear of post-entry
predation). When entry does arise, it usually is a mistake because nothing stops
the incumbent from driving the entrant from the market. As a result, the entrant
ends up losing the sunk cost of entry. While incumbents typically drive entrants
from the market with prices below the entrant’s break-even level, the incumbent
does not price below its own cost. Therefore, the Brooke Group policy which bans
below-cost pricing amounts to hunting unicorns and should have no e ect in our
setting. This turns out to be true. As expected, behavior under Brooke Group is
indistinguishable from Laissez-faire and equally bad for consumers.
Edlin’s policy has two consumer benefits. It lowers the monopoly’s pre-entry
price and it increases the frequency of entry in instances where the monopoly sets
9An exception is the final period, when it charges the monopoly price due to end-game e ects.
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a price that is not exclusionary. The first is a prediction of theory and the second
is a prediction of what happens o  the equilibrium path. When the incumbent
monopolist prices high prior to entry under Edlin, entry is typically profitable
because the monopolist cannot immediately respond with low prices. However, as
expected, duopoly prices are usually higher than in the other treatments.
Baumol’s policy su ers from monopoly pricing prior to entry just as Brooke
Group and Laissez-faire do. On the other hand, Baumol has the lowest prices after
exit because price cuts are permanent. Baumol leads to more entry than Brooke
Group and Laissez-faire, though less than Edlin.
The overall e ect of the policies on consumer surplus di ers considerably from
the e ect on total welfare. For su ciently experienced players, Edlin and Baumol
both deliver higher consumer surplus than the remaining policies, with Edlin the
highest. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, however, total welfare is lower
in Edlin than in the other three cases. This result is the downside of the entry-
promoting e ect of Edlin’s policy, which implies duplication of fixed costs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and the experimental design, and it derives theoretical predictions. Section 3
presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory and Experimental Design
2.1 The Game
In this subsection, we explain the general framework and the four game variants—
Laissez-faire, Brooke Group, Baumol, and Edlin—used in the experiment.
Two firms, a low-cost incumbent L and a high-cost potential entrant H (hence-
forth, “the rival”), can produce a homogeneous good and participate in a four-
period game. In period 1, only the incumbent is present in the market. In periods
2–4, each firm decides whether to participate in the market or to stay out. A firm
that chooses to stay out earns a payo  of 50 per period from an outside option.
To participate in the market, a firm has to pay 250 per period. Thus, including
the opportunity cost from the foregone outside option, the fixed costs are 300 per
period. Once a firm decides to exit, it cannot re-enter in subsequent periods.
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We opted for per-period costs, rather than only one-shot set-up costs, because
having recurring fixed costs such as rent is typically realistic and is required to
make exit meaningful and di erent from zero production. We chose not to include
set-up costs in addition to per-period costs, because this would have increased the
complexity of the experiment for subjects substantially. For simplicity, we also
excluded a re-entry option.
In each period, the market demand is given by
D(p) = 80≠ p.
If only one of the firms i = L,H is active in the market in a given period, its de-
mand function coincides with the market demand. Facing this demand, it chooses
its price as a monopolist. Suppose now both firms are active in the market in a
given period. They simultaneously and independently choose a price pi for the
production of the homogeneous good. Their action sets are integers in an inter-
val [p, p] with treatment-specific boundaries. Consumers buy at the lowest price.
Hence, each firm faces the following demand:
Di(pi, pj) =
Y___]___[
80≠ pi if pi < pj,
1
2(80≠ pi) if pi = pj,
0 if pi > pj.
A firm is considered dominant in a given period t if it produced and served the
entire market in the prior period t≠ 1.10 Firm i’s duopoly payo  in a given period
is
ﬁi = (pi ≠ ci)Di(pi, pj)≠ 250
where ci is the marginal cost. The incumbent has a technological advantage over
the rival and thus produces the good at a lower marginal cost. Marginal costs are
cL = 20 for the incumbent and cH = 30 for the rival.
The games di er with respect to the interval [p, p] in which the dominant firm
can choose its price. A firm which is not dominant can always choose its price in
10This includes both the cases that the firm was a monopolist and the case that it undercut
the competitor in duopoly. Moreover, it applies to the incumbent as well as to the rival.
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the entire interval [0, 80]. In our baseline game, Laissez-faire, the dominant firm
can choose, on an equal footing with the entrant, its price in the interval [0, 80].
In the Brooke Group game, a dominant firm in a duopoly in period t cannot
choose a price below its own marginal cost in that period, that is, it is restricted
to choosing pti œ [ci, 80].
In the Baumol game, a restriction in pricing in period t applies only after exit
of the competitor of the dominant firm. In this case, the firm is not allowed to
choose a price above its price in t≠1 in period t and all subsequent periods. Hence,
pt+ki œ [0, pt≠1i ] for k = 0, 1 . . . , 4≠ t. If the other firm has not left the market in t,
the dominant firm can choose its price in the entire interval [0, 80].
Finally, in the Edlin game, in period t the dominant firm faces a price floor
such that it cannot choose a price below 80% of its price in t ≠ 1, that is, pti œ
[0.8 · pt≠1i , 80]. This restriction applies only if the market in t is a duopoly.
To sum up, we implement an experimental game that is as simple as possible,
but still su ciently rich to study the strategic incentives created by the policies.
Thus, we made the following design decisions: (a) no re-entry possibility; (b) a
finite time-horizon; (c) asymmetric marginal costs; (d) a specific choice of the Edlin
parameter (0.8). Our choice of the allowable price reduction (20%, as suggested
by Edlin (2002)) was guided by the consideration that it should give incentives for
the incumbent to reduce pre-entry prices to deter entry as well as incentives to an
entrant to meaningfully undercut the prices of a high price incumbent.11
2.2 Predictions
We now describe the subgame-perfect equilibria of the four games underlying our
experimental treatments. For simplicity, we carry out the analysis for continuous
price sets. Moreover, we define the total fixed cost F so that it includes the
opportunity cost of 50 from the foregone outside option. Hence, F = 300. We first
introduce some self-explanatory terminology.
1. The break-even price pB◊ for ◊ œ {L,H} is given by
1
pB◊ ≠ c◊
2
D(pB◊ ) = F .
2. The entry-deterring price pú of L in the Edlin game is defined by 0.8pú = pBH .
11It will be clear from the analysis below that, with a su ciently large allowable reduction,
the incumbent could keep the price at the monopoly level and still fight o  the entrant.
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It is important to note that the break-even price is calculated by setting the eco-
nomic profit equal to zero rather than the payo s (that do not account for the
opportunity cost of the foregone outside option).
Figure 1 gives an overview of the relevant prices and marginal costs. Most
0
cH
30
pBH
36.97
pM (cH)
55 80
0
cL
20
pBL
25.5
p⇤
46.2
pM (cL)
50 80
Figure 1: Overview of the prices (for firm H and firm L)
aspects of the ordering depicted in this figure hold for all conceivable parameter-
izations, not just for those chosen for the experiment. However, two comparisons
are specific to our parameterization: first, the break-even price pBL of firm L is be-
low the marginal cost cH of firm H. Thus, our assumptions on demand, marginal
and fixed costs reflect a situation with a substantial cost advantage of the in-
cumbent.12 Second, the entry-deterring price pú is below the monopoly price of
the low-cost firm (pM (cL)). This reflects the choice of a su ciently rigid Edlin
restriction as discussed above.
We formulate the results in a non-technical way. We confine ourselves to de-
scribing the equilibrium outcome and the most important features of the equi-
librium strategies. Apart from the proofs, the online appendix contains precise
formal statements of equilibrium strategies and tie-breaking rules.
2.2.1 Laissez-Faire and Brooke Group Games
We treat the Laissez-faire and Brooke Group games together, as the analysis is
essentially the same.
Proposition 1. The Laissez-faire and Brooke Group games both have a subgame-
perfect equilibrium (SPE) in pure strategies. The SPE outcome is that there is no
12Without this assumption, further equilibria would emerge.
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entry and the incumbent charges its monopoly price. The equilibrium strategies in
each period are such that pricing in any period is independent of previous prices.
Moreover, the rival will exit from duopoly immediately after any o -equilibrium
entry. Finally, any SPE has these properties.
The intuition is straightforward. In both games, both firms are essentially free
to set arbitrary prices.13 Prices therefore do not a ect future behavior. Thus, in
each period, firms set prices that are optimal in the short term. In particular,
in any duopoly situation, the incumbent undercuts the entrant in equilibrium.
Anticipating this, the rival will not enter.
It is intuitively clear that Proposition 1 does not depend on the details of our
parameterization: the only thing that matters is that prices today do not a ect
prices and entry behavior tomorrow.
2.2.2 Baumol Game
The Baumol game is much more complex. After entry, the incumbent knows that,
if it undercuts the rival, its duopoly price is an upper bound for future prices if
the rival exits. Intuitively, this reduces the incumbent’s incentives to fight against
the rival with low prices. It must weigh the short-term benefits from undercutting
against the long-term benefits from being allowed to charge the monopoly profit.
As we show in more detail in the appendix, in duopoly subgames the resolution
of this trade-o  leads to the occurrence of multiple equilibria where prices do not
necessary equal the rival’s marginal cost. However, none of these equilibria yields
prices that are high enough for the entrant to break even. As a result, there is
no entry in any equilibrium. The following result summarizes the equilibrium. It
relies on tie-breaking rules that are stated in more detail in the appendix.
Proposition 2. The Baumol game has an SPE without entry in which the in-
cumbent sets its monopoly price in all periods. In this SPE, in any subgame with
a duopoly, the asymmetric Bertrand equilibrium where both firms charge the high
cost cH is played in periods 2–4. In addition, there are other SPE yielding the
13In the Brooke Group game, prices below own costs are not allowed, but the incumbent does
not rationally choose such prices anyway.
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same outcome, with prices in period 2 above cH , but below the rival’s break-even
point. All SPE are of this type.
The equilibrium outcome is thus the same as in the Laissez-faire and Brooke
Group games.14 The di erence exclusively concerns o -equilibrium behavior.
Thus, while Proposition 2 does not predict entry, it suggests that exclusionary
pricing might be less likely to emerge under Baumol’s policy.
2.2.3 Edlin Game
The equilibrium prediction of the Edlin game and the o -equilibrium behavior
di er from the two previous cases.
Proposition 3. The Edlin game has an SPE without entry, in which the in-
cumbent sets the entry-deterring price pú except in period 4 where it charges the
monopoly price. The equilibrium strategies involve hit-and-run entry in the o -
equilibrium path where the incumbent prices above pú: the entrant prices just below
the incumbent’s Edlin restriction and exits in the next period. Any equilibrium has
these properties.
Intuitively, the crucial aspect of the Edlin game is that, after su ciently high
incumbent prices, the entrant can earn positive net profits for one period by under-
cutting the Edlin restriction. Anticipating this, the incumbent faces two options.
First, it can choose the monopoly price, which will attract entry. Second, it can
choose an entry-deterring price, thereby avoiding entry, but earning lower pre-
entry profits. Given our parameterization, the latter option is more attractive.
Thus, though the SPE does not involve entry, the Edlin rule has a desirable e ect
on prices.
Note, however, that there also is a sense in which the Edlin rule seems to be
more conducive to entry than the alternatives: after high prices of the incumbent,
the rival will rationally enter because it is protected from competition. This di ers
from the previous games where entry does not occur in any subgame equilibrium.
14An open issue here is to which extent the equilibrium structure depends on parameters. For
instance, with a longer interaction, the incumbent may be more reluctant to fight after entry,
which could, in turn, lead to greater entry incentives.
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Figure 2: Welfare benchmarks of the four policies, a low-cost
monopoly with marginal cost regulation, and Bertrand compe-
tition.
2.2.4 Welfare
Figure 2 shows the welfare results in the equilibria of our four games. For com-
parison, we plot the welfare results for a low-cost monopoly under marginal cost
regulation. In this case, the incumbent makes a loss of 250. Because the rival
does not enter the market it earns the payo  from the outside option (50), which
brings the sum of the firms’ payo s to ≠200. We also plot the welfare results for
the Bertrand duopoly case, in which the low-cost firm serves the market at a price
equal to the high-cost firm’s marginal cost. In this case, the former’s payo  of 250
is exactly o set by the loss of the latter, such that the sum equals zero and overall
welfare is equal to consumer surplus.
At the other extreme, we consider a completely unregulated low-cost monopoly,
resulting in low consumer surplus and total welfare, but high firms’ payo s. This
corresponds to the outcome of the Laissez-faire, Brooke Group and Baumol games.
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The SPE of the Edlin game predicts no entry and entry-deterring prices in
periods 1–3. In the discrete version of the game, this means setting a price of
46, which results in firms’ profits of 684 (including the 50 of the rival), and a
consumer surplus of 578. The numbers shown in Figure 2 take into account that
this outcome is only predicted for periods 1–3, while in period 4 the outcome of
the Edlin game is identical to the other three policies. The results show that—if
the first-best is not available—there are several alternatives that might increase
welfare: among the equilibria of our four games the Edlin game results in a higher
level of consumer surplus and total welfare than Laissez-faire, Brooke Group and
Baumol, because pre-entry prices are lower and there is no adverse e ect on market
structure. Bertrand competition is desirable for di erent reasons: even if it comes
with a duplication of the fixed costs, it guarantees low duopoly prices.
2.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We apply a between-subjects design, so that each subject is assigned to one of the
treatments L’FAIRE, BROOKE, BAUMOL, or EDLIN. Each treatment consists of seven
rounds of the respective four-period game outlined above. In all treatments, we use
a stranger matching protocol such that, at the beginning of each round, groups of
two subjects are randomly drawn from the subjects in a matching group. In each
group and in each round, the roles (incumbent or rival) are randomly reassigned
within the groups. When a new round starts and the subjects are newly matched,
neither subject knows anything about the decisions of the other firm in prior
rounds. Within a given round, the roles and the firms remain the same. At the
end of each period, subjects are informed about the market price, the output sold,
and the payo s realized by each of the firms in their group.
The sessions were run in the WiSo experimental research laboratory of the
University of Hamburg in July 2015 and were programmed in z-Tree (Bock et al.,
2014; Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were randomly allocated to computer termi-
nals in the laboratory so that they could not infer with whom they would interact.
Throughout the experiment, communication was not allowed. We provided writ-
ten instructions which informed the subjects of all the features of the markets
(see Appendix B). Similar to other studies on experimental oligopolies, we used an
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economic framing (see, e.g., Huck et al. (2004)), where we explain the strategic sit-
uation in terms of firms, prices, and quantities. Prior to the start of the treatment,
subjects had to answer control questions. When answering the control questions
and when choosing their actions during the game, subjects had access to a payo 
calculator allowing them to calculate the payo  of hypothetical combinations of
their actions and the actions chosen by their competitors.
We calculated the payo s in the experiment in an experimental currency unit
called points. At the beginning of the session, subjects were endowed with 1500
points to cover potential losses. The payments to the subjects consisted of a e5
show-up fee plus the sum of the payo s over the course of the experiment. The
sessions lasted for about 90 minutes, and the average earnings were e16.80. We
conducted ten sessions—two sessions per treatment for L’FAIRE and BROOKE and
three sessions per treatment for BAUMOL and EDLIN—with a total of 228 partici-
pants. The subjects were undergraduate students from the University of Hamburg.
3 Results
We first show that in L’FAIRE above-cost predatory pricing occurs frequently. As a
result, many participants do not enter, and those who do often exit. After that, we
investigate the potential of the three policies to improve the situation. Through-
out our analysis, we distinguish between three market structures: (i) PreEntry,
the phase from period one until entry which captures all situations in which the
incumbent needs to worry about future entry;15 (ii) Duopoly, after the rival has
entered the market and the two firms compete, namely, the phase in which we
may observe exclusionary behavior; and (iii) PostExit, after one of the two firms—
typically the rival—has left the market and, thus, no entry threat exists.16 Finally,
we discuss the dynamics across the seven rounds of the game.
15More precisely, we define PreEntry as consisting of all periods in which the rival did not yet
enter, except period four. We exclude the final period, because the incumbent no longer can
have any concerns about future market entry.
16The three market structures are typically encountered in this specific order. In very few
cases, we observe that the incumbent exits and the rival enters in the same period or later. In
this case, the group moves directly from PreEntry to PostExit.
15
3.1 Predatory Pricing Under Laissez-Faire
In this section, we first show that above-cost predatory pricing is prevalent under
Laissez-faire. We define pricing as predatory (or exclusionary) if it prevents a rival
from breaking even; such pricing provides rivals with the incentive to exit a market
or not to enter in the first place. By this definition, when the incumbent charges
37 or below, it is predatory pricing because the entrant cannot help but lose money
by being in the market.17 The definition thus encompasses both below-cost and
above-cost predatory pricing.
Prior to entry (in PreEntry), the incumbent is a monopoly and prices as such.
The average observed price is 49.6, with 83 percent of the cases at exactly the
monopoly price of 50.18 Entry lowers the average incumbent’s price substantially
to 34.9, which is in the exclusionary range of 37 and below.19
Figure 3 shows the frequency of incumbents’ duopoly prices for di erent price
ranges. No incumbent prices below its own marginal cost of 20, so that there is no
below-cost predatory pricing, and such pricing is a unicorn in our game. However,
most incumbents (75 percent) respond to entry with above-cost predatory pricing:
26 percent of the prices are in the category above the incumbent’s marginal cost
and below the rival’s marginal cost, while around half of the observations (49 per-
cent) are above the rival’s marginal cost and below the rival’s break-even point.
As a consequence, entrants usually make a loss. The average profit is ≠235 per
period, and entrants only earn a positive profit in 13.4 percent of the cases when
they are in competition with an incumbent. Presumably as a reaction, most en-
trants leave the market: among the 93 cases where rivals join the duopoly market
in periods two or three, 57 (61.3 percent) leave the market at some point, so that
the incumbent is again in a monopoly.
17In the discrete version of the game, the rival cannot break even if the incumbent sets 37. It
cannot profitably undercut the incumbent as 36 < pBH ; and the variable duopoly profits obtained
when both firms charge 37 do not su ce to cover fixed costs.
18The frequent choice of the price 50 might partly be explained by the fact that 50 is a
prominent number. However, in the cases when the rival becomes a monopolist, we also observe
the monopoly price (55) frequently (70 percent), indicating that most subjects are able to find
payo  maximizing solutions.
19The decrease is highly significant (p = .008, exact Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This and all
subsequent non-parametric tests are based on independent matching group averages.
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Figure 3: Incumbent prices in
Duopoly of L’FAIRE.
Aside from the fact that entrants do not remain in the market, the most im-
portant e ect of exclusionary pricing is that rivals do not dare to contest the
incumbent in the first place. In one third of all rounds, rivals do not enter. Over
the course of the seven rounds, there is a clear trend towards less entry. While in
the first round 95.8 percent of the rivals enter the market, the percentage drops
to 41.7 percent in the final round. Thus, by the time the rivals anticipate the
incumbents’ likely reaction, most do not enter.
After the incumbent has successfully pushed the entrant out of the market,
the game is in the PostExit structure. The incumbents switch back to monopoly
pricing with an average of 50.7.20
Result 1. In L’FAIRE, incumbents generally engage in above-cost predatory pricing.
They mostly succeed in pushing the entrants out of the market and apparently
dissuade the majority of experienced rivals from entering.
These observations largely match the theoretical predictions, except for the
prevalence of entry when theory predicts no entry. There are several potential
explanations of the entry behavior. Rivals may initially be completely naive about
the possibility of exclusionary pricing. Slightly more sophisticated rivals may be
concerned about possible post-entry price reductions, but they may not understand
20There are a few instances where the incumbent leaves the market, making the entrant a
monopolist. The average price in these situations is 54.8 which is basically identical to the rival’s
monopoly price (55).
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how much they need to earn to profitably enter the market. This is plausible as
there are three di erent notions of costs to keep track o : variable costs (30 per
unit), fixed operating costs (250) and opportunity costs (50). Finally, rivals may
be aware of the potential problem, but hope that the incumbent tries to get away
with high prices. All of these possibilities are consistent with the observation that
entry becomes far less common over time, because subjects learn that entry is
usually not profitable.
3.2 Policy E ects
The results in the previous section show that above-cost predatory pricing occurs
under Laissez-faire. They also suggest that fear of such behavior may discourage
entry. However, one cannot be sure about this last claim without comparing the
Laissez-faire results to a situation in which exclusionary pricing is impossible or
restricted. In this section, we provide such a benchmark. We compare a laissez-
faire regime with the Brooke Group, Baumol and Edlin policies, respectively. The
Edlin policy is particularly important, because it directly limits above-cost preda-
tory pricing by design: if we see more entry in EDLIN than in L’FAIRE, this will
show that fear of price cuts by the incumbent prevents entry in the latter case.
Policy can potentially a ect market outcomes via two channels. First, policy
may influence the entry decision and therefore the frequency of the three market
structures (PreEntry, Duopoly, PostExit). Second, policy may a ect prices under
each of the market structures. In the following, we will isolate the two e ects. We
start by showing how the policies a ect prices under each market structure. Then,
we investigate the policy e ects on market structure.
3.2.1 Prices Under Di erent Market Structures
PreEntry: Theory predicts that in L’FAIRE, BROOKE, and BAUMOL, the incumbent
will charge the monopoly price of 50 in PreEntry, because its price does not a ect
entry. In EDLIN the incumbent will charge 46 in order to deter entry.
Figure 4 bins the observed prices into three categories. The intervals are moti-
vated by our theoretical analysis. The intermediate category [47, 53] contains the
monopoly price as well as slightly higher and lower prices; this category is what
18
theory predicts we should expect under the first three treatments. Low prices in
[0, 46] are those that qualify as entry-deterring under the Edlin rule, by which we
mean that, for these prices, the incumbent can ensure that the entrant loses money
in the following period. High prices in [54, 80] are not predicted by our theoretical
model for any treatment.
Figure 4 shows that in L’FAIRE, BAUMOL, and BROOKE, the incumbent generally
prices in the intermediate category at or near the monopoly level. The average
price we observe in the PreEntry structure is close to the monopoly price of 50
in the first three treatments, with 49.6 in L’FAIRE, 49.1 in BROOKE, and 50.0 in
BAUMOL. EDLIN produces substantially di erent results with 44.9 percent of the
observations in the low price bin. The average price is at 46.2, very close to the
theoretical prediction.21 Thus, firms systematically respond to the Edlin rule and
frequently choose entry-deterring prices as expected.
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Figure 4: Distribution of incumbent prices in the
structure PreEntry.
21The di erences across all treatments are significant at p = .011 (Kruskal-Wallis test). The
bilateral di erence between EDLIN and L’FAIRE (BAUMOL) is significant at p = .033 (p = .002).
For two-group tests, we report p-values of exact Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. All tests use the
independent matching group averages as observations.
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Duopoly: Advocates of strict predatory pricing rules want to reduce the fre-
quency of predatory pricing, while Laissez-faire advocates worry about the con-
sumer loss from discouraging price wars. As there is some entry in all treatments,
we can investigate the policy e ects on exclusionary pricing.
The bars in the left panel of Figure 5 show the frequency of predatory pricing
(37 or lower) by incumbents in the periods where they compete with the rival.
We find that the frequency is 75.3 percent in L’FAIRE, 69.5 percent in BROOKE,
66.1 percent in BAUMOL and 50.3 percent in EDLIN. In EDLIN, the frequency is
significantly lower than in any of the other three treatments.22
The lower frequency of predatory pricing in EDLIN is clearly due to the policy
restrictions. When incumbents are not restricted by the rule, we observe a very
high frequency of above-cost predatory prices (88.0 percent) even in EDLIN.23
These observations are very much in line with what we would expect. In L’FAIRE
and BROOKE, nothing prevents the incumbents from setting above-cost predatory
prices, and it is optimal for them to do so. In BAUMOL, firms can set duopoly prices
as they want, but they must worry about the adverse consequences for allowable
post-exit prices. Finally, in EDLIN, incumbents are simply not allowed to pursue
exclusionary pricing after high pre-entry prices.
The right panel of Figure 5 is essentially the mirror image of the left panel.
It shows the market prices in Duopoly. L’FAIRE and BROOKE produce the most
competitive prices, followed by BAUMOL and EDLIN.24 The di erences between ad-
jacent bars are not significant, but the comparison between EDLIN and the first two
treatments is (p < .004). In addition, if we pool the observations from L’FAIRE and
BROOKE and test against BAUMOL, the di erences become significant at p = .043.
Consequently, while BROOKE does not have an e ect, the two other policies have
the downside that they lead to higher prices than L’FAIRE when entry happens.
22p < .003, Wilcoxon rank-sum test on average frequency in the matching group. All other
bilateral comparisons are insignificant (p > .128).
23Incumbents are not restricted when either no rule applies to them or the rule allows predatory
prices.
24In all treatments, prices are clearly above the entrant’s marginal cost. This is in contrast to
the results of Boone et al. (2012), who find prices close to the marginal cost of the less e cient
firm, while other experimental studies on Bertrand oligopolies with asymmetric costs find prices
above the Nash equilibrium (Dugar and Mitra, 2016; Argenton and Müller, 2012). An important
di erence between our design and these studies is that, in our case, the entrant faces fixed costs.
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Figure 5: Prices in Duopoly. Left panel: frequency of predatory
pricing by the incumbents across treatment. Right panel: market
prices across treatment. Spikes indicate standard errors, calcu-
lated with clustering on matching group.
PostExit: In the structure PostExit, the firm remaining in the market has
a monopoly and does not face the threat of market entry. Unless restricted, we
would expect that such a firm sets the monopoly price. This is indeed the case:
incumbents’ average prices are very close to 50 with 78 percent or more at exactly
50 in L’FAIRE, BAUMOL, and EDLIN.25 In BAUMOL, we observe significantly lower
prices due to the price cap. Virtually all firms (97.8 percent) price at the Baumol
price cap whenever it applies. The average PostExit price of the incumbents is
38.7.26
Result 2. In PreEntry and PostExit, average prices are close to the monopoly
level. Lower prices only occur in EDLIN in PreEntry and in BAUMOL in PostExit.
In Duopoly, above-cost predatory pricing is frequent in L’FAIRE, BROOKE, and BAU-
MOL. EDLIN substantially reduces the frequency of above-cost predatory pricing.
When both firms are in the market, L’FAIRE and BROOKE yield the most competi-
tive pricing.
25In the cases where the incumbent exited, we observe prices close to the monopoly price of
the entrant of 55.
26The di erences to all other treatments are highly significant.
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By and large, the results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. In-
cumbents that are not challenged by potential entry or know they can adjust prices
freely after entry have no incentive to deviate from the monopoly price. It takes
restrictions on post-entry price reductions (EDLIN) to induce low pre-entry prices,
whereas low post-exit prices only obtain when price increases after exit are pro-
hibited (BAUMOL). In duopoly cases, above-cost predatory pricing is expected in
all treatments—with the obvious caveat that in EDLIN, the incumbent might be
limited in its ability to price low by its earlier pricing decisions.
3.2.2 Market Structure E ects
Result 2 shows how the price e ects of policy depend on market structure. How-
ever, the overall policy e ects will also depend on how often each of the three
market structures will arise under each policy. We now show how policy a ects
these frequencies.
Entry: We first compare the overall entry frequency under the di erent poli-
cies. Recall that theory predicts no entry under any rule in equilibrium. In addi-
tion, there is no entry in L’FAIRE, BROOKE, or BAUMOL in any subgame equilibrium,
even after o -equilibrium prices. In EDLIN, there is no entry on the equilibrium
path, but entry occurs following incumbent prices above 46.
Unlike predicted, we observe entry in all regimes. In period 2, we observe that
51.8 percent enter in L’FAIRE, and 45.2 percent in BROOKE. BAUMOL (60.6 percent)
seems to encourage entry, presumably because rivals hope that the incumbent is
reluctant to fight: anticipating the Baumol restriction, incumbents know they have
to continue to price low after exit. As suggested by our o -equilibrium analysis,
we find the highest fraction of entry decisions in EDLIN with 72.7 percent.27
Incumbent Price and Entry: We will now show that policy not only af-
fects the frequency of entry, but also the circumstances under which entry occurs.
According to Proposition 3, under the Edlin rule, entry is the best response to
prices above the entry-deterring price of 46, whereas under the other rules, entry
is usually a poor choice regardless of the incumbent’s pre-entry price.
27Di erences across all treatments are significant at p = .005, di erences between EDLIN and
L’FAIRE or BAUMOL are significant at p < .003.
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Figure 6: Frequency of entry for di erent incumbent prices in the
previous period. For this figure, we use all periods in which the
rival can enter. We use the same bins for the incumbent price in
the previous period as in Figure 4. Spikes indicate standard errors
(with clustering on matching group).
Figure 6 shows the fraction of rivals entering the market, conditional on the in-
cumbent’s price in the previous period. In all treatments, above-monopoly prices
seem to encourage entry, ranging from 63.3 percent in BAUMOL to 85.4 percent
in EDLIN. However, entry behavior di ers across policies in the intermediate price
range. For prices near the monopoly level, entry is quite rare in L’FAIRE and
BROOKE (30.8 and 25.4 percent), and somewhat higher in BAUMOL (43.7 per-
cent). For all these treatments, there is a significant di erence between entry
after monopoly prices (middle bin) and after above-monopoly prices (right bin) at
p < .032. In stark contrast, EDLIN produces more than twice as much entry as the
other treatments after incumbent prices near the monopoly level, with 86.0 per-
cent of rivals entering the market. The entry frequency for low incumbent prices
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is similar in all treatments. To conclude, incumbent prices above the monopoly
price encourage entry in all treatments, whereas prices close to the monopoly price
typically discourage entry just as much as lower prices, unless the Edlin rule is in
place.
The di erences in the circumstances under which rivals enter are closely related
to what happens to them after entry. In L’FAIRE, 67.0 percent of the entrants are
undercut by the incumbent in the first period after entry, and around half of the
entrants who experience undercutting after entry exit immediately. The numbers
for BROOKE and BAUMOL are similar, with slightly less undercutting but even
more exit. On the other hand, in EDLIN, 78 percent of the entrants undercut the
incumbent in the first period after entry, but nevertheless 50.9 percent exit. This
shows that entry is typically of a hit-and-run type. Contrary to the L’FAIRE and
BROOKE cases, entry in EDLIN is often profitable.
Frequency of Market Structures: Table 1 shows the percentage of periods
in which the market is in a given structure in each of the four treatments.
Table 1: Frequency of market structures
Structure L’FAIRE BROOKE BAUMOL EDLIN
PreEntry 55.1 59.1 47.3 37.0
Duopoly 27.7 22.9 25.2 31.4
PostExit 17.3 18.0 27.5 31.6
Notes. Percentage of periods with a given market structure, separated by treat-
ment. In addition to the cases defined at the beginning of Section 3, category
PreEntry also contains those Period 4 interactions for which the rival has not
previously entered in the round under consideration, and PostExit contains the
few cases when both firms exited the market.
The main insights are as follows. In line with our observations on the frequency
of entry, we find that PreEntry is most common in L’FAIRE and BROOKE, and
particularly rare in EDLIN. Duopoly periods are more common in EDLIN than in
the remaining treatments. However, the particularly anti-competitive PostExit
situation is most frequent for EDLIN.28
28It is also quite frequent for BAUMOL, but, in this case, the adverse e ect is mitigated by
the Baumol rule. The treatment di erences are significant (p = .000, ‰2 test with correction for
clusters).
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Result 3. We observe frequent market entry in all treatments, particularly in
EDLIN and, to a slightly lesser extent, in BAUMOL. Consistent with the theory of
o -equilibrium path behavior, entry in EDLIN mainly happens in cases where the
incumbent does not set entry-deterring prices. With experience, entry drops con-
siderably in L’FAIRE and BROOKE, but much less so in the two other treatments.
The relative entry frequencies match the di erences in protection given to en-
trants under the di erent policies. In L’FAIRE and BROOKE, there is no protection
whatsoever, in EDLIN, it is provided directly by the downward price freeze for the
incumbent. In BAUMOL, there is some indirect protection, because post-entry price
reductions are costly for the incumbent if the rival exits.
3.3 Dynamics
For the analysis so far, we considered all seven rounds of the game. Investigating
the dynamics across the seven rounds gives us an indication of whether play con-
verges towards the theoretical predictions once subjects become more experienced
with the strategic environment. We first study the dynamic in prices and then in
market structure.
Prices: Throughout the experiment, average prices in PreEntry for L’FAIRE,
BROOKE, and BAUMOL are very close to the monopoly price, in particular, in the
last round, when more than 85 percent of the incumbents set the monopoly price.
Model (1) in Table 2 shows the results of OLS estimates for the incumbents’ pre-
entry prices in the first period (with clustered standard errors). Prices in EDLIN are
significantly lower than in the omitted case (L’FAIRE) and in BAUMOL (p = .006).29
The di erences between EDLIN and the other treatments become stronger later in
the experiment, as is shown in Model (2), where we estimate treatment-specific
time trends. EDLIN shows a highly significant negative time trend, while the other
three treatments do not. A closer look at the data shows that incumbents’ prices in
EDLIN are initially close to the monopoly price, but then drop sharply to averages
around 45 in rounds 5–7. In the first half of the rounds (1–4), 32.8 percent of the
incumbents choose entry-deterring prices in PreEntry. In the second half of the
29The di erence between EDLIN and BROOKE is insignificant, which is due to relatively similar
prices in early rounds.
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rounds, this percentage increases to 59.2 percent. This pattern suggests that it
took some time for the subjects to learn how to react to the strategic incentives
provided by the Edlin rule.
Model (3) in Table 2 explains market prices in Duopoly. Prices are significantly
higher in BAUMOL and EDLIN than in L’FAIRE and BROOKE, and the overall time
trend is significantly negative, suggesting that competition becomes fiercer in later
rounds. In Model (4), we qualify this observation by estimating separate time
trends: the point estimate is negative in all four treatments, but significant only
in L’FAIRE.
Table 2: Incumbents’ prices in PreEntry and market prices in Duopoly
Price in t = 1 (PreEntry) Market price in Duopoly
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BROOKE ≠1.405 ≠3.548 0.255 ≠0.616
(0.976) (2.888) (1.093) (1.837)
BAUMOL 0.300 ≠1.669 2.080ú 1.274
(0.921) (2.010) (0.933) (1.264)
EDLIN ≠2.679ú ≠1.340 3.216úú 1.865
(1.044) (1.785) (0.906) (1.225)
Round ≠0.123 ≠0.277ú
(0.163) (0.124)
Round ◊ L’FAIRE ≠0.281 ≠0.527ú
(0.198) (0.259)
Round ◊ BROOKE 0.254 ≠0.260
(0.522) (0.333)
Round ◊ BAUMOL 0.211 ≠0.281
(0.258) (0.215)
Round ◊ EDLIN ≠0.616úú ≠0.136
(0.203) (0.211)
Constant 50.598 51.232 32.733 33.553
(1.011) (1.335) (0.825) (0.937)
F -test 2.8 3.9 6.4 3.8
Prob > F 0.042 0.003 0.001 0.003
R2 0.024 0.033 0.047 0.048
N 798 798 1720 1720
Notes: OLS estimates. Dependent variables in model (1) and (2): incumbent’s price in
period 1. Model (3) and model(4): market prices in Duopoly. Independent variables:
treatment dummies, round, interactions, and a dummy for incumbent. Robust standard
errors, clustered on matching group, in parentheses. ú p < 0.05, úú p < 0.01.
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Market structure: Figure 7 shows the fraction of games in which the rival
enters at some point across the seven rounds. Across all treatments, we observe
that there is less entry when subjects gain experience with the game. The drop
is particularly strong in L’FAIRE and BROOKE. In both cases, the fraction of games
in which the rival enters drops from close to 100 percent in the first round to less
than 50 percent in the second half of the experiment (rounds 5–7). While there
is also a drop in entry as experience increases, entry remains substantially more
frequent in BAUMOL (63.0 percent) and in particular in EDLIN (86.9 percent) in the
second half of the rounds.30
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Figure 7: Frequency of rival entry across the seven rounds and by
treatment.
The observations confirm the impression that, at least in L’FAIRE and BROOKE,
subjects initially enter because they ignore or at least underestimate the risk of
exclusionary pricing, whereas they tend to assess it correctly in later rounds. For
the other policies, it is less clear that entry is a mistake, because the rules o er
30The di erence in entry between inexperienced and experienced subjects is significant for
L’FAIRE (p = .008), BROOKE (p = .016), and BAUMOL (p = .010), but not for EDLIN (p = .129),
Wilcoxon signed-rank test on matching group averages.
27
some protection for the entrant. Consequently, there is a smaller reduction in
entry with increasing experience.
Result 4. Over the course of the seven periods we observe no time trend in the
prices when incumbents hold the monopoly, with the exception of PreEntry in
EDLIN, in which subjects converge on average to the entry-deterring prices only
in the second half of the rounds. Price wars in Duopoly tend to become fiercer in
later rounds. As subjects gain experience with the game, entry becomes less fre-
quent in all treatments, but the drop is much more pronounced in the treatments
which o er least protection for the entrant (L’FAIRE and BROOKE).
The dynamics across the seven rounds suggests that some of the strategic
incentives set by the di erent policies require experience to become e ective. In
our welfare analysis below we therefore put more emphasis on the results of the
games with experienced subjects and we will restrict some of the analysis to the
second half of the experiment, i.e., rounds 5–7.
3.4 Welfare Implications of the Policies
The results presented so far clearly illustrate that two of the three alternative
policies result in significantly di erent market outcomes than the laissez-faire ap-
proach. While the outcome of BROOKE is very similar to L’FAIRE, EDLIN results in
lower prices prior to entry and BAUMOL results in substantially lower prices after
exit. Moreover, the latter two policies encourage entry. We now summarize the
welfare implications of these results.
3.4.1 Consumer Surplus and Welfare for Fixed Market Structures
Figure 8 shows how our previous price observations translate into results on con-
sumer surplus, conditional on market structure. The bars show the average con-
sumer surplus from rounds 5–7, where subjects have experience with the policies.31
In PreEntry, the consumer surplus is very close to the predicted monopoly con-
sumer surplus of 450 in all but one treatment. The exception is EDLIN, in which
31The results of rounds 1–4 are qualitatively identical, with the only notable di erence that
the advantage of EDLIN in PreEntry is not yet as pronounced as in rounds 5–7.
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Figure 8: Consumer surplus in rounds 5–7. Bars show average consumer surplus,
spikes indicate standard errors (with clustering on matching group).
the predicted price prior to entry is 46 resulting in a consumer surplus of 578.
The observed consumer surplus is even higher with 678.32 In Duopoly, we observe
the most competitive outcomes in L’FAIRE and BROOKE, but the overall treatment
di erences are not significant (p = .155, Kruskal-Wallis test). In PostExit, only
BAUMOL results in a consumer surplus significantly and substantially higher than
in the unregulated monopoly.
In terms of total welfare (consumer surplus plus producer surplus net of fixed
operating costs) results in rounds 5–7 are very similar as for consumer surplus only:
EDLIN is significantly more e cient than the other treatments in PreEntry, and
the same is true for BAUMOL in PostExit. For Duopoly, on the other hand, EDLIN
is significantly less e cient than the other treatments. Apart from the duplication
of fixed costs, the reason for this di erence is that, under the Edlin rule, it is
more likely that the entrant serves the market than in the other treatments, which
results in e ciency losses due to the higher marginal cost.
3.4.2 Overall Comparison
Finally, we analyze the overall welfare implications, taking into account that poli-
cies also a ect market structure and not only prices conditional on market struc-
ture. Table 3 shows the average consumer surplus and welfare over the four periods
of the game. The resulting numbers aggregate the policy e ects on pricing and
32The di erence between EDLIN and each of the other three treatments is highly significant
(p < .002, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests).
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Table 3: Consumer surplus and welfare across treatment
Consumer surplus Welfare
Rounds 1–4 Rounds 5–7 Rounds 1–4 Rounds 5–7
L’FAIRE 702 597 1050 1123
BROOKE 697 533 1096 1101
BAUMOL 738 664 1117 1118
EDLIN 649 697 970 1049
Notes. Average consumer surplus and welfare across the four periods of the
respective game, for Rounds 1–4 and Rounds 5–7 of the experiment.
market structure. The theoretical benchmarks with monopoly in all four periods
and no entry result in a consumer surplus of 450 and a welfare of 1150. This is
the prediction for all treatments but EDLIN, in which case there are three periods
of entry-deterring prices and monopoly prices in the fourth period, resulting in an
average consumer surplus of 546 and a welfare of 1234. In rounds 1–4, there are
no significant overall di erences across treatments in consumer surplus (p = .105,
Kruskal-Wallis test). In rounds 5–7, di erences become significant (p = .005)
with BAUMOL and, even more so, EDLIN generating more consumer surplus than
the other two treatments. For welfare, however, we observe significant di erences
across the four treatments in rounds 1–4 (p = .000), with the lowest welfare in
EDLIN. When subjects gain experience in EDLIN (rounds 5–7), the di erences in
welfare across treatments become insignificant (p = .229).
Result 5. Edlin’s policy proposal dominates a laissez-faire approach prior to en-
try, and Baumol’s policy does so after exit. Both policies come at the cost that
competition tends to be weaker in duopoly. The overall welfare e ects depend on
the frequency of these market structures. EDLIN is favorable from a consumer per-
spective when firms are su ciently experienced with the rule. Overall welfare is
lowest in EDLIN, while the other three treatments produce very similar results.
The low consumer surplus in L’FAIRE and BROOKE is essentially in line with
what we would expect and mostly driven by the lack of entry and the high pre-
entry prices. The higher consumer surplus in BAUMOL is not predicted by the SPE.
It directly reflects the greater frequency of entry and the lower post-exit prices.
Finally, the high consumer surplus in EDLIN reflects both the frequent entry and
the low pre-entry prices.
30
The relatively low total welfare in EDLIN is the downside of particularly pro-
nounced (o -equilibrium) entry. Entry not only leads to duplication of fixed costs,
but also to relatively low variable profits reflecting (undesired) production by the
high-cost rival as well as (desired) competitive pressure. This leads to the observed
deviations from the theoretical predictions.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Economists, lawyers, and policy makers debate whether post-entry price cuts dis-
courage entry and whether we should care. This paper studies such price cuts
in a multi-period interaction between a low-cost monopolistic incumbent and a
high-cost potential entrant. We compare a laissez-faire setting with three di er-
ent policy interventions: the legal standard of the Brooke Group rule, according
to which below-cost pricing is prohibited; a policy that prohibits certain post-
entry price cuts (Edlin, 2002); and a policy that prohibits post-exit price increases
(Baumol, 1979).
In subgame-perfect equilibrium, there is no entry in any of these settings. Un-
der the Laissez-faire, Brooke Group and Baumol policies, this is true even though
the incumbents choose monopoly prices. Under the Edlin rule, the incumbent
prices below the monopoly level because this is needed to prevent entry. In the-
ory, nothing resembling predatory pricing occurs on the equilibrium path. In this
sense, predatory pricing is a unicorn from a theoretical perspective.
The observations of the experiment di er from our theoretical predictions. Nei-
ther L’FAIRE nor BROOKE – the current U.S. policy – place any relevant constraints
on post-entry price cuts. Despite this, there is some entry in both treatments,
which is followed by price wars and often exit. Both pre-entry and post-exit prices
tend to monopoly levels. In both L’FAIRE and BROOKE, the incumbent frequently
responds to entry with prices too low for the entrant to break even. As these prices
are low enough to induce exit and discourage entry, they are exclusionary and we
call them above-cost predation. Such pricing is no unicorn. It is prevalent.33
33Such a pattern fits the anecdotal evidence in Bolton et al. (2000) who report that, in the six
years following the Brooke Group decision, plainti s have not prevailed in any of the 39 reported
cases in the federal court.
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Edlin’s (2002) restrictions on post-entry price cuts substantially encourage en-
try, particularly in later rounds when people understand the game better. Put
di erently, the anticipated price cuts in L’FAIRE and BROOKE must have discour-
aged entry and been exclusionary in practice. The incumbent’s price cutting not
only induces exit, but its prospect discourages entry. In EDLIN, prices are substan-
tially lower prior to entry. This makes sense. The incumbent cannot discourage
entry with the threat to price low after entry unless it prices low prior to entry.
While the massive entry in EDLIN benefits consumers, it has the downside that it
involves a replication of fixed cost and higher cost production by the entrant.
Baumol’s post-exit price restrictions lead to an intermediate frequency of entry
and lower post-exit prices. However, pre-entry prices are as high as in L’FAIRE and
BROOKE, and duopoly prices are slightly higher than in those cases.
The welfare comparison in the theoretical model is trivial. Because there is no
entry in any treatment and pricing in the Edlin policy is low while it is monopoly
in the other three regimes, Edlin’s policy dominates whether from a consumer or
a total welfare perspective. The experimental analysis, however, reveals a more
complex picture. Since policies di er with respect to the e ects on entry, as well
as on duopoly and post-exit prices, a full welfare judgment needs to take all these
e ects into account. For the specific parameter values of our model, these e ects
mean that both lenient approaches to above-cost predation, L’FAIRE and BROOKE,
and BAUMOL all perform well with respect to total welfare and substantially better
that EDLIN. From a consumer perspective, however, EDLIN is preferable.
There is scope for exploring the robustness of our analysis. Most directly, it
would be instructive to vary some of our main assumptions. Apart from considering
smaller cost di erences and other policy parameters, it would seem particularly
important to explore longer games under di erent assumptions for the length of
protection by the Edlin and Baumol rules. Moreover, one could explore the e cacy
of these policies in a situation of learning by doing such as Cabral and Riordan
(1994) and Besanko et al. (2010, 2014), where it is possible for an ine cient entrant
to eventually be e cient.
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Online Appendix
Hunting Unicorns? Experimental
Evidence on Predatory Pricing Policies
Aaron Edlin, Catherine Roux, Armin Schmutzler, Christian Thöni
A Proofs
We now provide careful statements of our theoretical results and proofs. We start
by formulating two tie-breaking rules.1
(T1) In any situation where both firms charge the same price, but a profitable
downward deviation for exactly one firm is feasible, this firm wins the entire
market (and becomes dominant).
The condition addresses two types of situations. First, it applies to cases where
one firm is at its marginal cost (and thus cannot profitably reduce its price).2 Sec-
ond, it is relevant if one firm is at the Edlin constraint (and thus cannot reduce its
price at all). The tie-breaking rule reflects the idea of a suitable discrete approxi-
mation.
Moreover, we have a tie-breaking rule regarding participation:
(T2) If firm H is indi erent between entering and not entering given the subsequent
subgame strategies, it will not enter.
We maintain these tie-breaking assumptions throughout the paper.
1Our instructions assume that, for ties, firms share the profits 50-50. For the equilibrium
analysis, we nevertheless need tie-breaking rules.
2In this case, the tie-breaking rule generates the standard textbook outcome that both firms
charge at cH , but firm L receives the entire demand. The relevant implication of this outcome
that firm L serves the entire market at price cH can be generated more precisely in an equilibrium
where firm H mixes on an interval of prices cH and higher (see Blume 2003, and Kartik 2011).
1
A.1 Laissez-Faire and Brooke Group Games
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is identical for both games. There is a unique equilibrium strategy
profile such that
(i) both firms play their respective monopoly price in subgames when they are
alone in the market;
(ii) both firms choose the Bertrand duopoly price (cH) in subgames when both
firms are present;
(iii) firm L participates for every history; firm H does not participate for any
history.
Clearly, in period 4, the described monopoly strategies are optimal; the strategy
profile in the duopoly case is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the asym-
metric Bertrand game. Anticipating this, firm H only participates in period 4 if
firm L has previously exited. In period 3, suppose L is the monopolist. It antici-
pates being the monopolist in period 4 independent of pricing, so it sets pM(cL).
The argument is analogous if H is the monopolist (meaning that L has exited).
If both firms are present, they anticipate that firm L will be the monopolist in
period 4, independent of pricing in period 3. Thus, they set prices without taking
period 4 into account, and the short-term Bertrand equilibrium emerges in period
3. Anticipating this pricing behavior, it is clear that only firm L is expected to
earn positive net profits in the market, unless firm H is the monopolist in period 3.
This gives the entry decision. The argument in the preceding periods is analogous.
A.2 Edlin
We first formulate a version of Proposition 2 that describes the equilibrium strate-
gies in more detail. This result clearly implies the statement in the main text.
2
A.2.1 Re-Statement of Proposition
Proposition 1. The Edlin Game has an SPE described in (i)-(ix) below. This
equilibrium is not unique, but any SPE in pure strategies generates the same out-
come.
(i) Firm L participates in periods t Æ 3 for arbitrary histories after which it has
not previously exited. In period 4, L exits if and only if pL3 > pú and H has not
previously entered (or L was dominant in period 3).
(ii) H participates in period t only if it has not previously exited and (a) L has
exited, or (b) L was dominant in period t≠ 1 with pLt≠1 > pú.
(iii) In periods in which L is a monopolist, it sets prices as follows: If H has not
yet entered in any period t Æ 3, L sets pLt = pú (entry deterrence). Otherwise, L
sets pL4 = pM(cL) = 50.
(iv) If L has previously exited, Player H sets pHt = pM(cH) = 55.
(v) If both firms participate in Period 4 and neither firm was dominant in period
3, pL4 = pH4 = cH (and firm L takes the market given the tie-breaking rule).
(vi) Suppose both firms participate in Period 4 and L was dominant in period 3:
(a) If 0.8pL3 œ [0, cH ], pL4 = pH4 = cH and firm L takes the market;
(b) If 0.8pL3 œ (cH , 80], pL4 = pH4 = 0.8pL3 and firm H takes the market.3
(vii) Suppose both firms participate in Period 4 and H was dominant in period 3:
(a) If 0.8pH3 œ [0, cH ], pL4 = pH4 = cH
(b) If 0.8pH3 œ (cH , 80], pL4 = pH4 = 0.8pH3 ;
Firm L takes the market in both cases.
(viii) If both firms participate in periods t = 2, 3, and L was dominant in period
t≠ 1, price-setting is as follows:
(a) If 0.8pLt≠1 œ [0, cH ], then pLt = pHt = 0.8pLt≠1 and firm L takes the market;
(b)If 0.8pLt≠1 œ
1
cH , pM(cH)
È
, then pLt = pHt = 0.8pLt≠1 and firm H takes the mar-
ket;
(c) If 0.8pLt≠1 œ
1
pM(cH), 80
È
, then pLt Ø 0.8pLt≠1; pHt = pM(cH), and firm H takes
the market.
(ix) If both firms participate in Period 3 and firm H was dominant in period 2,
3In the special case that 0.8pL3 = cH , the firms share the market, so that neither firm is
dominant.
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price-setting is as follows:
(a) If 0.8pH2 œ [0, cH ], then pL3 = pH3 = cH ;
(b) If 0.8pH2 œ (cH , pú], then pL3 = pH3 = 0.8pL2 ;
(c) If 0.8pH2 œ (pú, 80], then pL3 = pú; pH3 Ø 0.8pH2 .
Firm L takes the market in all three cases.
(x) If both firms participate in Period 3 and neither firm was dominant in period
2, both firms set cH and firm L takes the market.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We define the quasi-cost of a firm with cost type ◊ œ {L,H} that was dominant
in period t≠ 1 in period t as ‚c◊ = max 10.8p◊t≠1, c◊2.4
Existence Period 4: For period 4, consider pricing: Obviously, setting the
monopoly price is optimal for a monopolist as the competitor cannot be present in
the future (see (iii) and (iv)). In any case where both firms are present in the last
period, the game corresponds essentially to a static asymmetric Bertrand game
with marginal costs of the dominant firm replaced with the quasi-marginal cost‚c◊. By arguments similar to those from the Bertrand game (together with the
tie-breaking rule) a last-period price profile is a subgame equilibrium if and only
if both firms price at max (‚cH , ‚cL). The winner is the unconstrained firm by the
tie-breaking rule. Together, these arguments show (v)-(vii). They also show (iii)
and (iv) for t = 4.
For period 4, consider participation. Anticipating the pricing behavior of L,
H chooses to participate only if it is possible to break even in the last period,
which requires one of the two conditions (a) and (b) in (ii): For (a), H earns the
monopoly profit in period 4; for (b) she earns a non-negative net profit by setting
pH4 = 0.8pL3 . If neither of these conditions hold, undercutting of firm L does not
lead to positive net profits, so that entry is not profitable.
Anticipating the pricing behavior of H, Firm L only exits whenever she cannot
set an entry-deterring price; that is, whenever L was dominant in period 3 with
pL3 > p
ú.
4The motivation for calling this a quasi-cost is that the constraint to price above 0.8p◊t≠1 has
a similar e ect on behavior as the constraint not to price below marginal cost.
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Period 3 Pricing: In any subgame starting after the period 3 participation
decisions, players anticipate that the competitor chooses the equilibrium strategy
in period 4 after any period 3 pricing decision. In particular, firm H anticipates
that, if firm L is in the market in period 3, it will stay and set prices in period 4
such that firm H cannot obtain a positive net profit unless firm L is dominant in
period 3 with pL3 > pú; similarly, firm L anticipates that firm H will participate in
period 4 only if pL3 > pú and firm H was dominant in period 3. With this in mind,
consider the pricing decisions in period 3.
Suppose first both firms are in and H was dominant in period 2 (see ix).
First, let 0.8pH2 Æ cH : With the proposed prices (and the tie-breaking rule), firm L
earns a profit of (cH ≠ cL)D (cH) in period 3. It induces exit of firm H and earns
monopoly profits in period 4. Lower prices of Firm L in period 3 would reduce
the period 3 profits of firm L without resulting in more profit in period 4. Any
prices above cH would lead to zero profits in period 3 and, at most the monopoly
profit in period 4. Thus, firm L is best-responding. Firm H earns no profits, but
cannot avoid this given that firm L undercuts in period 3 (and thereby also sets
an entry-deterring price for period 4).
Second, let 0.8pH2 œ (cH , pú]: With the proposed prices (and the tie-breaking rule),
firm L earns a profit of
1
0.8pH2 ≠ cL
2
D
1
0.8pH2
2
in period 3. It induces exit of firm
H in period 4 and earns monopoly profits in period 4. Lower prices in period 3
would reduce period 3 profits without resulting in more profit in period 4. Higher
prices in period 3 would lead to zero profits in period 3 and, at most the monopoly
profit in period 4. Thus, firm L is best-responding. Firm H earns no profits, but
cannot avoid this.
Finally, let 0.8pH2 > pú. Firm H is constrained by the requirement that pH3 Ø
0.8pH2 > pú. For any such price of firm H, by following the proposed strategy
of setting pL3 = pú, firm L obtains a gross profit of (pú ≠ cL)D (pú) in period 3;
moreover L induces exit of firm H and earns the monopoly profit in period 4.
This is a best response for L: For any higher price, firm H would participate in
period 4, so that firm L would earn at most one monopoly profit (in period 3). For
any lower price, firm L would still prevent entry and earn the monopoly profit in
period 4, but period 3 profits would be lower than (pú ≠ cL)D (pú). Firm H earns
zero profits, but it cannot avoid this.
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Next, suppose both firms are in and L was dominant in period 2 (viii):
First consider 0.8pL2 Æ cH : In the proposed equilibrium both firms set cH . If
0.8pL2 < cH , by the tie-breaking rule, firm L wins in this period (with the maximum
possible period 3 profit given pH3 = cH); as cH < pú, she obtains the monopoly
profit in period 4. Thus, L is best-responding. Firm H earns zero profits, but
cannot avoid this; thus H is also best-responding. If 0.8pL2 = cH , the argument is
essentially the same, except that the two firms share the market in period 3 (as
both firms are constrained below, the tie-breaking rule does not apply).
Second, suppose 0.8pL2 œ (cH , pú]: In the proposed equilibrium, firm H undercuts
firm L and is thus dominant. Hence, in the next period firm H does not enter
according to her strategy, and firm L earns the monopoly profit. Firm H is best-
responding, because she cannot avoid having zero profits in period 4 (as pL3 =
0.8pL2 Æ pú) and her profit in period 3 is maximal given the behavior of firm
L. Firm L is also best-responding: She earns the monopoly profit in period 4;
moreover, given her constraint and the behavior of firm H she cannot prevent
losing in period 3.
Third, let 0.8pL2 œ
1
pú, pM(cH)
È
: In the proposed equilibrium, firm H undercuts L
in period 3. Firm L earns the monopoly profit in period 4. It cannot undercut firm
H in period 3; so it is best-responding. Firm H obtains the maximal possible profit
in this period,
1
0.8pL2 ≠ cH
2
D
1
0.8pL2
2
≠ F , but no profit in period 4. The only
potentially profitable alternative would be to set a higher price and thereby avoid
undercutting L. Then L would exit in period 4 (as 0.8pH2 > pú) given its strategy,
and firm H would earn
1
pM(cH)≠ cH
2
D
1
pM(cH)
2
≠F in period 4, but would also
have to pay the additional fixed cost in period 3. Thus, H is best-responding if1
0.8pL2 ≠ cH
2
D
1
0.8pL2
2
≠ F Ø
1
pM(cH)≠ cH
2
D
1
pM(cH)
2
≠ 2F . The right-hand
side is 125. The condition holds for 0.8pL2 œ [37.679, 70.811], and, in particular, in
the interval
1
pú, pM(cH)
È
= (44.544, 50] under consideration.
Fourth, suppose 0.8pL2 œ
1
pM(cH), 80
È
. Firm H earns the monopoly profit
in period 3, and firm L earns the monopoly profit in period 4. Firm L cannot
undercut firm H in period 3; thus it is best responding. Firm H cannot prevent
that firm L takes the market in period 4, unless it gives up on winning in period
3 and thus becoming dominant. Winning immediately, and thus not incurring the
fixed cost in period 4 is preferable.
6
Now suppose both firms are in and neither was dominant in the
previous period (x):
In this case, both firms are free to set arbitrary prices. The argument is as in
an asymmetric Bertrand equilibrium, taking into account that firm H will exit in
the next period and firm L will win the market.
Finally, consider situations with only one firm is in the market (iii)
and (iv) for t=3. If firm H is monopolist, then this is because firm L has exited.
There is no re-entry threat; firm H thus obtains the monopoly profit in two periods
by applying her strategy, which clearly is optimal. If firm L is monopolist, this
could be because firm H has exited or because it has never entered. In the former
case, there is no re-entry threat; firm L thus obtains the monopoly profit in two
periods by applying her strategy, which clearly is optimal. In the latter case,
firm L has to take into account that firm H will enter in period 4 if and only if
pL3 > p
ú. In the proposed equilibrium, L deters entry by setting pL3 = pú. She
thus earns a positive profit (pú ≠ cL)D(pú) ≠ F if she adheres to the equilibrium
strategy. This is clearly the best possible response among those that deter entry.
The best way not to deter entry is to set pL3 = pM (cL). This way, however, firm
L only obtains the monopoly profit once, which is less than with the proposed
equilibrium behavior.
Next, consider participation decisions in period 3.
First, consider player L. According to the proposed equilibrium strategies, she
stays in the market. If she was not dominant in period 2, she expects a positive
profit in both periods, so staying is optimal. If she was dominant in period 2 with
pL2 < p
ú, this is also true, because she expects firm H to exit. If she was dominant
with pL2 > pú, L expects that H will enter and undercut in period 3, so that L
will earn no profit in period 3, and she will pay the fixed cost of 300. However, in
period 4, she will be the monopolist and earn the net profit 600. Thus, staying is
a best response.
Second, consider player H. Clearly, if L has exited, participation (as proposed
by the strategy) is optimal for H. If L is in period 3, H participates only if L
was dominant in period 2 with pL2 > pú. By staying if pL2 > pú, H earns positive
net profits in period 3. She will exit thereafter, but participating in period 3 is
nevertheless profitable. By not participating if pL2 Æ pú, she earns zero profits in
7
periods 3 and 4. Given the strategy of player L, she cannot avoid this.
The argument in period 2 is analogous to the argument for period
3. The only slightly larger di erence concerns the case that L is in and 0.8pL1 œ1
pú, pM(cH)
È
: In the proposed equilibrium, firm H undercuts L in period 2 and
Firm L earns the monopoly profit in periods 3 and 4. L cannot undercut firm H
in period 2; so it is best-responding. Firm H obtains the maximal possible profit
in this period given the price of firm L,
1
0.8pL1 ≠ cH
2
D
1
0.8pL1
2
≠F , but no profit
in periods 3 and 4. The alternative would be to avoid undercutting L. However,
then L would still remain in the market in period 3 given its strategy, and firm
H would earn at most
1
pM(cH)≠ cH
2
D
1
pM(cH)
2
≠F in period 3 (and no profit
in period 4). The deviation is thus even less attractive than in the corresponding
situation in period 3 for 0.8pL2 œ
1
pú, pM(cH)
È
.
In Period 1, the only pricing deviation for firm 1 worth considering
is that it chooses the monopoly price. Doing this yields a short term gain of
650≠ 620. 23 = 29. 77, but a loss of the monopoly profit (650) in the next period.
Thus, the proposed strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Uniqueness We already saw that we cannot hope for more than outcome unique-
ness. Clearly, any SPE must involve the above-described behavior in Period 4.
Consider pricing in Period 3.
Suppose both firms are in and H was dominant in period 2.
First suppose 0.8pH2 œ [0, pú]. Consider an arbitrary equilibrium price candidate
pH3 œ (cL, pú]. Then it is always the unique best response of firm L to undercut
marginally: Given period 4 behavior, this yields the monopoly profit in period 4
and, given pH3 , the maximum possible profit in period 3. Thus, any equilibrium
with pH3 œ (cL, pú] must have pL3 = pH3 and firm L taking the market. Moreover,
any such equilibrium must have pH3 = ‚cH , for otherwise firm H could profitably
deviate downwards. Clearly, there can be no equilibrium with pH3 > pú: In this
case, firm H could profitably undercut whenever pL3 > 0.8pH2 . If pL3 Æ 0.8pH2 , firm
L could profitably deviate by increasing the price to pú. Finally, equilibria with
pH3 Æ cL can clearly not exist. Thus, all equilibria must contain prices in period 3
as described in (ix)
Second suppose 0.8pH2 > pú. Then it is clearly the unique best response for firm L
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to set pL3 = pú. As (ix) allows for arbitrary behavior of H that is consistent with
the Edlin constraint, there can be no other equilibrium than those mentioned in
(ix).
Suppose both firms are in and L was dominant in period 2.
Suppose 0.8pL2 œ [0, cH ]. There can be no equilibrium with pL3 > pú, as firm
L would thereby giving up period 4 monopoly profits, which it could avoid by
setting pú (this deviation could potentially lower period 3 profits, but never by an
amount that would not make it worthwhile).
There can be no equilibrium with pH3 > cH If firmH wins in such an equilibrium
and pH3 < pú, firm L could undercut and earn a positive profit in period 3 (and still
the monopoly profit in period 4). Now suppose firm L wins in such an equilibrium.
We already saw there can be no equilibrium such that pL3 > pú. Thus suppose
pL3 Æ pú. Then H can increase profits by marginally undercutting. Clearly there
can be no equilibrium with pH3 = pL3 = pú.
There cannot be an equilibrium with p◊3 œ [0, cL) for at least one ◊ œ {L,H}
either. As firm H would earn (avoidable) negative gross profits, there can be no
equilibrium with pH3 Æ pL3 and pH3 œ [cL, cH). There can be no equilibrium with
pL3 < p
H
3 and pH3 Æ pú, as firm L could increase profits by increasing price (while
still inducing exit). Finally, consider pH3 œ [cL, cH) and pH3 > pL3 . Firm L could
profitably increase prices.
If pH3 Æ pL3 , firm L could profitably undercut firm H. Thus, the only remaining
possibility is pH3 = pL3 = cH .
Suppose 0.8pL2 œ (cH , pú]. For any allowable pL3 œ
Ë
0.8pL2 , pú
2
, firm H knows
that it will earn zero profits in period 4 no matter what it does in period 3. Thus,
it has the unique best response to undercut marginally, so that pH3 = pL3 . Clearly,
there can be no such equilibrium with pL3 > 0.8pL2 , as both firms could profitably
undercut. Thus, we must indeed have pL3 = pH3 = 0.8pL2 . Next consider pL3 > pú.
If pL3 < pH3 , firm L would become dominant in period 3 and thus give up the
monopoly profit in period 4. It could thus profitably deviate to pú. If pH3 < pL3 ,
firm H would benefit from increasing its price slightly. If pH3 = pL3 , H would
benefit from undercutting marginally. Finally, suppose pL3 = pú and 0.8pL2 < pú. If
pH3 < p
L
3 , firm H would benefit from increasing its price slightly. If pH3 Ø pL3 , H
would benefit from undercutting.
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Suppose 0.8pL2 œ
1
pú, pM (cH)
È
. Given the restrictions of L, firm H can always
undercut marginally and thereby secure a profit of
1
pL3 ≠ cH
2
D
1
pL3
2
≠F . This is
always a best response: Not undercutting would mean that she would induce exit
of firm L, so that she would earn the monopoly profit in period 4, but she would
have to pay the fixed cost twice. By previous arguments, not undercutting is not
a profitable deviation. Pricing lower than pL3 would mean profit losses in period 3,
without any compensating gains. Finally, an equilibrium with prices above 0.8pL2
cannot exist: Firm H could always increase profits by reducing its price, without
any compensating losses.
Suppose 0.8pL2 œ
1
pM (cH) , 80
È
. As (viii) does not restrict the strategy of L
beyond the Edlin restriction, we only check whether there can be another price of
H than pM (cH) in any equilibrium. For any price of L, this would have to lead
at least to one monopoly profit of firm H (as H can always secure this by setting
pM (cH)). Given the strategy of L in period 4, getting a gross monopoly profit
in period 4 is only possible for H if it does not undercut L in period 3 who then
cannot avoid that firm H enters in period 4. However, any such strategy of firm
3 means that it wins only one (gross) monopoly profit, but has to pay the fixed
costs twice. As the alternative of winning the monopoly profit immediately and
paying the fixed cost only once is always available (independent of the behavior of
L), pricing above L in period 3 cannot be a best response.
Remaining Arguments
The above arguments on pricing in Period 3 imply the statements on partic-
ipation (Part (i) and (ii) of Proposition 4). The argument for the uniqueness of
pricing behavior in Period 2 duopolies is similar as for Period 3 except that it is
simpler because the incumbent is always dominant. Thus behavior from period 2
on in any equilibrium is as described in Proposition 4. As the first-period behav-
ior of firm L described in Proposition 4 is strictly optimal given the reactions in
periods 2 and following, there can be no other equilibrium.
A.3 Baumol
We start by presenting a version of Proposition 3 that specifies the strategies in
more detail. We then prove the result.
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A.3.1 Re-Statement of Proposition 3
In the Baumol case, we will occasionally invoke a tie-breaking rule which applies
in specific constellations when neither firm prices at its quasi-cost. It deals with
situations where no firm wants to let the other firm win (so as to avoid being
constrained in the next period), whereas the other firm is happy to win (and will
exit in the next period).
(T3) Suppose in t = 2, 3 both firms charge the same price, but neither firm prices
at its quasi-cost. Fix continuation strategies in t+1 for both firms. Suppose
firm i prefers leaving the market to j in period t rather than taking the
market (and conversely for j). Then j wins the market.
Proposition 2. The Baumol Game has a continuum of SPE described below, and
all equilibria have these properties:5
Periods t = 3, 4: If a firm ◊ is alone in the market after the other firm has
previously exited, and ◊ was dominant in the period s in which the other firm
exited, ◊ sets p—◊ = min(pM(c◊), p◊s). In any other situation such that ◊ is alone in
the market, it sets pM(c◊). If both firms are in the market, they set pHt = pLt = cH .
Only L participates unless (i) L has exited in period s<t and or (ii) L was dominant
in period t-1 and pLt≠1 < pBL . In case (i), only H participates if (a) firm L exited
before there was a duopoly or (b) L exited after a duopoly period in which pHs≠1 Ø
pHB ; if pHs≠1 < pBH nobody participates. In case (ii), both firms mix over participation
decisions and earn zero expected profits.
Period 2: Everything is as in periods 3 and 4, except in the duopoly situation.
Then both firms set arbitrary but identical prices in [cH , Âp2] such that
3 (Âp2 ≠ cL) (80≠ Âp2) = 2 1pM (cL)≠ cL2D(pM (cL))
and firm H takes the market. Âp2 is approximately 32.679.
L participates and H does not.
Period 1: L participates and sets the monopoly price.
5For simplicity, we continue to treat the pricing games in the heuristic textbook manner rather
than identifying mixed-strategy equilibria as Blume (2003) and Kartik (2011); see footnote 2.
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A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Period 4: The only non-trivial part of the argument concerns the participation
subgame in the case that there was a duopoly in period 3 where firm L was
dominant with pL3 < pBL . In this case, it is straightforward to show that there can
be no pure-strategy participation equilibrium: If neither firm participates, H can
profitably enter. If both firms participate, H earns negative profits. If only L
participates, it earns negative profits (as it is forced to price below break even). If
only H stays, L would benefit from staying (and undercutting).
However, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium (with zero expected profits)
where firm H stays with probability r =
;(pL3≠20)(pL3≠80)+300
(pL3≠20)(pL3≠80)+500
<
and firm L stays
with probability q = 1125 . As usual, this comes from the indi erence conditions
(between staying and exiting). For firm L this is
r ((cH ≠ cL) (80≠ cH)) + (1≠ r)
1
pL3 ≠ cL
2 1
80≠ pL3
2
≠ F = 0.
As Firm H earns the monopoly profit if it participates and L is not participat-
ing, indi erence between staying and exiting requires
(1≠ q)
1
pM (cH)≠ cH
2 1
80≠ pM (cH)
2
≠ F = 0.
Together, these conditions give the above (uniquely defined) mixing probabili-
ties. The function below plots r as a function of pL3 : The lower the previous price
was, the higher the required participation probability of firm H that makes L want
to participate:
Period 3:
If a firm ◊ is alone in the market, because the other firm has previously exited
and ◊ had a market share of one in the period that the other firm exited, ◊ sets p—◊ .
It cannot set a higher price. A lower price will increase losses.
In any other situation such that ◊ is alone in the market, it sets pM(c◊).
This is obvious.
If both firms are in the market, they set pH3 = pL3 = cH .
Firm H earns nothing, but cannot avoid this.
Firm L earns 2 (cH ≠ cL) (80≠ cH) ≠ 2F = 400 this way (because she takes
12
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Figure A1: Baumol Game: Mixed strategy of the entrant in Period 4
the market today, she is Baumol constrained tomorrow). The only conceivable
profitable deviation would be to let H win today. Then L could set the monopoly
profit in period 4 and earn a total profit
1
pM (cL)≠ cL
2
D(pM (cL)) ≠ 2F = 300.
This deviation is not profitable. The uniqueness argument is similar to standard
arguments in the static Bertrand game; in addition, one has to take into account
that, for higher prices, L would be prepared to undercut, because the short-term
profits would be su ciently attractive to make up for the (relatively small) long-
term losses from the Baumol restriction.
In the participation subgame, there is a unique subgame equilibrium such that
only L participates unless (i) L has previously exited in period s and or (ii) firm
L was dominant in period 2 with pL2 < pBL . In case (i), there is a unique subgame
equilibrium such that only H participates if pHs Ø pBH ; otherwise nobody partici-
pates. In case (ii), there is no pure-strategy SPE of the period 3 subgame. However,
there is an equilibrium where both firms mix over participation decisions. In this
equilibrium, both firms earn zero profits.
This is all straightforward except for the mixing equilibrium in participation
decisions. Thus consider the case that L was dominant with pL2 < pBL .
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The argument for why there is no subgame equilibrium is essentially as in period
4: If neither firm participates, H can profitably enter. If both firms participate,
H earns negative profits in period 3 (asymmetric Bertrand equilibrium); in the
ensuing subgame in period 4 it earns zero on expectation. If only L participates,
it earns negative profits (as it is forced to price below break even). If only H stays,
L would benefit from staying (and undercutting); thereby earning positive profits
in periods 3 and 4.
Let t be the staying probability of H in period 3. Indi erence of firm L requires
that t = (p
L
2≠20)(pL2≠80)+300
(pL2≠20)(pL2≠80)+700 (see the plot below)
           




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


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pL2
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Figure A2: Baumol Game: Mixed strategy of the entrant in Period 3
To see this, suppose L stays. If H does not stay in period 3, firm
L will make losses because of the Baumol constraint, and it will not be
present in period 4 to avoid further losses. This gives a profit contribution
(1≠ t)
11
pL2 ≠ 20
2 1
80≠ pL2
2
≠ F
2
< 0. If H stays in period 3, firm L will earn
(cH ≠ cL) (80≠ cH)≠ F in the asymmetric Bertrand equilibrium in period 3. Be-
cause pL3 = cH > pBL , firm H will exit and L will stay, but is constrained to set
pL4 = cH . The expected profits from staying are thus
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(1≠ t)
11
pL2 ≠ 20
2 1
80≠ pL2
2
≠ F
2
+ t (2 (cH ≠ cL) (80≠ cH)≠ 2F ) .
Inserting parameters and setting this equal to zero gives the mixing probability.
If firm H stays, it earns positive profits only if firm L exits in Period 3. (If
firm L stays, H will clearly not earn profits in period 3 and it will earn the zero
expected MSE profits in period 4).
Let s be staying probability of L. If L does not stay, H wins the net monopoly
profit in both periods. If L stays in period 3, H earns nothing in the resulting
asymmetric Bertrand game. As L has then reverted to setting pL3 = cH and hence
above the Baumol price, H exits thereafter, thus earning a total net profit of ≠300
in periods 3 and 4. Thus, the indi erence condition is (1≠ s) (650)≠ s (300) = 0,
yielding s = 1319 .
Next consider period 2.
In this period, the Baumol constraint has no bite, because there has been no
previous duopoly interaction. Thus, any firm that is in the market is free to set
its price without any constraints. However, in the duopoly case, the firms will be
concerned about constraints that there pricing has on future prices in case of exit
of the competitor.
In period 2, consider the suggested prices in [cH , Âp2]: Firm L leaves the market
to firm H in period 2 (but pays the fixed cost) and then earns twice the monopoly
profit in the remaining periods; thus total profits are 2
1
pM (cL)≠ cL
2
(80 ≠
pM (cL))≠3F . The only conceivable profitable deviation would be to underbid the
competitor; which would then also mean L has to set the same price in the future.
This would give profits of at most 3 (Âp2 ≠ cL) (80 ≠ Âp2) ≠ 3F . By construction ofÂp2, firm L is indi erent between these two profits if p = Âp2 because
3 (Âp2 ≠ cL) (80≠ Âp2) = 2 1pM (cL)≠ 202 (80≠ pM (cL)) = 1800
For any price equilibrium candidate p2 in [cH , Âp2), 3 (p2 ≠ cL) (80 ≠ p2) <
3 (Âp2 ≠ cL) (80≠ Âp2); firm L thus strictly prefers firm H to win.
Given that both firms set the same price and firm H wins the market with
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a positive gross profit, she cannot earn higher short-term profits. By avoiding
to undercut, H would earn zero gross profits today. But this would not increase
profits in the next period, as it would exit anyway (as any price in [cH , Âp2] is above
the break-even price of L, who will stay).
Period 1: By setting the monopoly price, L can guarantee itself four times
the monopoly profit. Clearly this is optimal.
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B Instructions
[Instructions for L’FAIRE, translated from German. The parts that are di erent in
the instructions for BROOKE, EDLIN, and BAUMOL are reported in boxes]
General Instructions: We are pleased to welcome you to this economic study.
Please read the following instructions carefully. During this study, you have the
opportunity to earn a fair amount of money in addition to the 5 Euros that you
receive as an initial endowment for participating. The exact amount depends on
your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. You remain anonymous
during the entire study.
During the study, we do not speak of Euros but of points. Your entire income will
first be calculated in points. The total amount of points you earn will be converted
to Euros at the end of the study. The following conversion rate applies:
600 points = 1 Euro
To start with, you receive 1500 points to cover potential losses. At the end of
today’s session, you will receive your earnings from the study plus the initial
endowment of 5 Euros in cash.
We will explain the exact procedure of the study in the next pages. These
instructions are solely for private use, please do not communicate with the other
participants during the study. If you have any questions, please contact the
supervisors.
The Study: This study is divided into 7 separate rounds. In each round, you
are paired with another participant selected at random from those present in the
room. In each round, you are assigned one of two roles. Either you are firm A or
firm B. If you are assigned the role of firm A, the other participant in your group
is assigned the role of firm B and vice-versa. These roles are randomly allotted at
the beginning of each round and remain unchanged throughout this round. Each
round consists of four periods.
Firms A and B produce a homogenous good and sell this in the same market. In
each period that your firm participates in the market, you have to set the price at
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which you want to sell the good. At the beginning of each period, if you currently
participate in the market, you can decide to exit the market and, if you currently
do not participate in the market you can decide to enter it for this period. If you
decide to exit the market, you will not be able to enter it anymore for the entire
round.
Firm A and firm B di er in two respects:
1. Firm A produces the good at a lower cost than firm B.
2. Firm A starts o  in the market at the beginning of period 1 whereas firm B
can enter the market only at the beginning of period 2.
The procedure in a particular round is as follows (see figure A3).
Period 1:
(1) Firm A is alone in the market and sets a price (see (iii)).
(2) The profit of firm A is realized. Both firms learn the price, the quantity
sold and the profit of firm A (see (iv)).
Period 2 and all subsequent periods until the round ends:
(1) Each firm that participates in the market decides whether to exit the
market. Once a firm has exited the market, it cannot enter it anymore in
this round. In each period in which firm B has not entered the market
previously in this particular round, it decides whether to enter the market
(see (i)).
(2) Each firm learns the exit, respectively, entry decision of the other firm
(see (ii)).
(3) Each firm that participates in the market sets a price (see (iii)).
(4) Profits are realized. Both firms learn prices, quantities sold and profits
(see (iv)).
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(iii) price setting
(i) entry/exit
(ii) information
(iv) information
Figure A3: Sequence of Events
The profits are summed up across all periods in each round. After four periods a
round ends, and a new round begins. For the new round, participants are newly
paired, and the roles of firm A and B are randomly reassigned within these groups.
In every round, you are informed only about the decisions of the other firm in
your group. When a new round starts and you are matched with a new firm, nei-
ther of you will know anything about the decisions of the other firm in prior rounds.
Per-Period Profit: Your profit in each period depends on whether you partici-
pate in the market or not:
(i) Each period in which you do not participate in the market, you earn a fixed
amount of 50 points with certainty.
(ii) Each period in which you participate in the market, the factors market de-
mand, costs and price setting behavior determines your profit. How these
factors determine your profit is explained below.
Market Demand: In each period, each firm that participates in the market has
to decide which price to set. Both firms set their price at the same time. However,
only the firm with the lower price can sell the good. If the lower price is P the
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firm who sets this price sells Q units of the good. The quantity Q is determined
as follows:
Q = 80≠ P
Example: Suppose that you set a price of 70, and you are the firm with the lower
price. In this case, you sell 10 units. However, if you are the firm that sets the
higher price you do not sell anything. If both of you chose the same price then
you both sell half of the quantity Q. For example, both set a price of 10 and share
the resulting quantity (70) and sell 35 units each.
Costs: Each firm has two kinds of costs:
(i) Each selling firm pays a unit cost of production. This cost is 20 per unit for
firm A and 30 per unit for firm B.
Example: Suppose that you are firm A and sell 10 units. Your production
cost is then 10 ◊ 20 = 200. If you are firm B and you sell 10 units, your
production cost is 10◊ 30 = 300.
(ii) For each period in which a firm participates in the market, it has to pay a
fixed cost of 250. This cost is the same for firms A and B, and it is indepen-
dent of production.
Example: Suppose that you participate in the market but do not sell any-
thing. Hence, you make a revenue of zero and pay no unit cost of production.
However, you have to pay the fixed cost, and, thus, you make a loss of 250.
Price Setting: Prices are integers in between 0 and 80. You can choose any
price in this range.
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Price Setting Brooke:
In certain situations, however, not the entire price range between 0 and 80
is available. The graph below illustrates these situations. The upper part
of the graph corresponds to the market situation in an arbitrary period t.
Three situations are to be distinguished:
• In Situation 1, only you sell the good (black box) in period t while
the other firm does not sell anything (white box). The reason why the
other firm does not sell anything in period t may be twofold (dashed
line):
1. The other firm does not participate in the market in period t or
2. The other firm set a higher price than you did in period t.
If now the other firm participates in the market in the next period t+1
you are not allowed to set a price in period t + 1 that is below your
own unit cost of production. No restriction applies to the other firm.
If the other firm does not participate in the market in period t+ 1 no
restriction applies to you.
Example: Suppose that your unit cost of production is 20 and that,
currently, only you sell 10 units at a price of 70. If the other firm
participates in the market in the next period, you are not allowed to
set a price in the next period that is below 20. The other firm can set
any price between 0 and 80.
• In Situation 2, both you and the other firm set the same price in period
t and thus, both sell half of the total quantity each. In the next period
t+1, neither you nor the other firm are restricted in their price setting.
• In Situation 3, only the other firm sells the good in period t. You do
not sell anything because, either you do not participate in the market
in period t or you set a higher price than the other firm did. If now
the other firm participates in the market in the next period t + 1, it
is not allowed to set a price in period t+ 1 that is below its own unit
cost of production. If it does not participate in the market, it cannot
set any price. In period t+ 1, no restriction applies to you.21
Price Setting Brooke:
Situation 1
You Other
Situation 3
You Other
Situation 2
OtherYou
Other 
participates
Other does 
not 
participate
No restrictionYour price in t+1 
not below your 
cost
No restriction Price Other in t+1 
not below Other’s 
cost
No restriction 
Other 
participates
Other does 
not 
participate
t+
1
t
In a nutshell, the following rule applies: the firm that sells the good in t,
must not set a price in t+ 1 that is below its own unit cost of production if
the other firm participates in the market in t+ 1.
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Price Setting Edlin:
In certain situations, however, not the entire price range between 0 and 80
is available. The graph below illustrates these situations. The upper part
of the graph corresponds to the market situation in an arbitrary period t.
Three situations are to be distinguished:
• In Situation 1, only you sell the good (black box) in period t while
the other firm does not sell anything (white box). The reason why the
other firm does not sell anything in period t may be twofold (dashed
line):
1. The other firm does not participate in the market in period t or
2. The other firm set a higher price than you did in period t.
If now the other firm participates in the market in the next period t+1
you are not allowed to set a price in period t+ 1 that is below 80% of
your price in period t (rounded to integers). No restriction applies to
the other firm.
Example: Suppose that, currently, only you sell 10 units at a price of
70. If the other firm participates in the market in the next period,
you are not allowed to set a price in the next period that is below 56
(= 0.8 ◊ 70) (see supplementary sheet). The other firm can set any
price between 0 and 80.
• In Situation 2, both you and the other firm set the same price in period
t and thus, both sell half of the total quantity each. In the next period
t+1, neither you nor the other firm are restricted in their price setting.
• In Situation 3, only the other firm sells the good in period t. You do
not sell anything because, either you do not participate in the market
in period t or you set a higher price than the other firm did. If now
the other firm participates in the market in the next period t+1, it is
not allowed to set a price in period t+1 that is below 80% of its price
in period t. In period t+ 1, no restriction applies to you.
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Price Setting Edlin:
Situation 1
You Other
Situation 3
You Other
Situation 2
OtherYou
Other
participates
Other does 
not 
participate
No restrictionYour price in t+1 
not below 80% of  
your price in t
No restriction Price Other in t+1 
not below 80% of  
Other’s price in t
No restriction
Other 
participates
Other does 
not 
participate
t+
1
t
In a nutshell, the following rule applies: the firm that sells the good in t,
must not set a price in t+ 1 that is below 80% of its price in t (rounded to
integers) if the other firm participates in the market in t+ 1.
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Price Setting Baumol:
In certain situations, however, not the entire price range between 0 and 80
is available. The graph below illustrates these situations. The upper part
of the graph corresponds to the market situation in an arbitrary period t.
Three situations are to be distinguished:
• In Situation 1, both you and the other firm participate in the market
but only you sell the good in period t; the other firm sells nothing. If
now the other firm exits the market and thus does not participate in
the market in the next period t + 1, you are not allowed to increase
your price in t + 1 and in all subsequent periods in this round. If
the other firm participates in the market in the next period t + 1 no
restriction applies to you or the other firm.
Example: Suppose that, currently, both participate in the market, but
that you are the one who set the lower price, say, 70. In the current
period, only you sell the good, namely, 10 units. If the other firm exits
the market in the next period you are not allowed to increase your
price above 70 in the next and all subsequent periods in this round.
• In Situation 2, both you and the other firm set the same price in period
t and thus, both sell half of the total quantity each. In the next period
t+1, neither you nor the other firm are restricted in their price setting.
• In Situation 3, both you and the other firm participate in the market
but only the other firm sells the good in period t; you sell nothing. If
now you exit the market and thus do not participate in the market in
the next period t+1, the other firm is not allowed to increase its price
in t+1 and in all subsequent periods in this round. If you participate
in the market in the next period t+ 1 no restriction applies to you or
the other firm.
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Price Setting Baumol
Price Other not 
above Other’s price 
in t
t+
1
t
Situation 1
You Other
Situation 3
You Other
Situation 2
OtherYou
Other 
participates
Other does 
not 
participate
Your price not 
above your price 
in t
No restriction No restriction No restriction
You 
participate
You do 
not 
participate
In a nutshell, the following rule applies: the firm that sells the good in t,
must not increase its price in t + 1 and until the end of this round if the
other firm exits the market in t+ 1.
Calculation of Per-Period Profit: The per-period profit is calculated as
follows: each firm makes a revenue which equals price times units sold (P ◊ Q).
Subtracting the total cost incurred, that is, the sum of the production cost and
the fixed cost, gives the per-period profit.
Example: Suppose that you currently sell 10 units at a price of 70. With the cost
of firm A, the profit yield is 70◊ 10≠ 10◊ 20≠ 250, that is, 250. With the cost
of firm B, the profit yield is 70◊ 10≠ 10◊ 30≠ 250, that is, 150.
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Procedure: In each period, each firm that participates in the market sees the
input screen. In period 1, this screen appears only for firm A. Firm A thus sees
the following input screen:
The upper part of the screen shows the round in which you are in on the left;
in this example, it is round 1 of 7. On the right, you see a time specification in
seconds which indicates how much time you have left to enter your price. Please
try to reach your decision in the given time. Below the time indication, you
see in which period you are in. In this example, it is period 1. The remaining
part of the screen is divided into two sections. On the left, you can see the
“What-if-calculator”. You can use this tool to determine your per-period profit
using di erent prices. On the right, the screen reminds you of your unit cost of
production; in this example, 20 is shown as a value. Below the cost information,
you can enter the price you want to set in this period. In order to confirm a price,
you must click on the “OK” button. You can revise your price until you click on
this button. Once you have done this, you can no longer revise your decision for
this period.
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Notice that the layout of this screen as well as the “What-if-calculator” adapts
to the situation, namely, whether only one or both firms are in the market. In
particular, when both firms participate in the market, the input screen appears as
follows:
Here, in the example, you see the input screen of firm B in period 2 of round 1.
The left part of the screen shows again the “What-if-calculator”. Now you can
calculate your profit as a combination of your price and the price of the other
firm. On the right, you can see, in addition to your unit production cost, the unit
production cost of the other firm as well as whether this firm participates in the
market.
Brooke, Edlin, Baumol
If either your or the other firm’s price range is restricted, it is always indi-
cated on this input screen below the cost information. If none of the price
ranges is restricted in any way, nothing is indicated. In this example, nei-
ther your not the other firm’s price range is restricted: You can both set any
price between 0 and 80.
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After both firms have entered their price, it will be determined who serves the
market. Both firms will be informed on the prices, quantities and profits in this
period. Note that you can also incur losses.
Once you have read this information, please click on the “Continue” button.
In each period (other than period 1), prior to the price setting decision, each firm
that currently participates in the market has to decide whether to exit the market
for this and all subsequent periods in this particular round. Once a firm has exited
the market, it cannot enter it anymore in this round.
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In each period (other than period 1) in which firm B has not entered the market
previously in this particular round, firm B has to decide whether to enter the
market for this period. Only if firm B enters the market, it can set a price. Below
the cost information, the screen reminds firm B of the price that firm A set in the
previous period.
Each firm learns the exit, respectively, entry decision of the other firm. Each firm
that participates in the market in this period then goes on to price setting via the
input screen as it is explained above. Each firm that does not participate in the
market in this period can set no price and will be informed on the price, quantity
sold and potential profits at the end of this period.
Do you have any further questions? If so, please raise your hand. The supervisors
will come to you at your workplace. Otherwise, we kindly ask you to answer the
control questions on your screen.
30
